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Assessing whether distributional changes are « pro-poor » has become increasingly 
widespread in academic and policy circles. Starting from relatively general ethical 
axioms, this paper proposes simple graphical methods to test whether distributional 
changes are indeed pro-poor. Pro-poor standards are first defined. An important 
issue is whether these standards should be absolute or relative. Another issue is 
whether pro-poor judgements should put relatively more emphasis on the impact of 
growth upon the poorer of the poor. Having formalized the treatment of these issues, 
the paper describes various ways for checking whether broad classes of ethical 
judgements will declare a distributional change to be pro-poor. 
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 1 Introduction
Is growth good for the poor? This is certainly an issue on which much policy
and academic debate has taken place recently1. But, in what sense can growth
be declared ”pro-poor”? Answering this question properly would seem to require
going beyond the frequent use of simple average relationships between growth
and some summary poverty statistics – as is being increasingly recognized in the
literature.
There are two reasons for this. The ﬁrst one is that the usefulness of summary
poverty statistics depends on whether there is variability in the impact of growth
upon the poor. The second reason is that summary poverty statistics invariably
incorporate arbitrary and disputable normative judgements. This is true for all
poverty statistics, but it is particularly valid for the most commonly used pro-poor
measure: the change in a poverty headcount following growth. This change hides
the variability of the impact of growth among the poor; it also largely depends on
the impact of growth on those closest to the poverty line. For instance, growth
may very well reduce on average the proportion of the poor in a population, but in
some cases this may be at the cost of adverse and severe impacts on the very poor.
Taking this cost into account would certainly seem important.
A related reason for caution is that the link between growth and changes in
poverty indices can be highly sensitive to the choice of poverty lines. For instance,
even if the poor’s incomes always increased in line with average growth in the
economy, the impact of growth on the headcount would vary erratically across
countries according to their respective densities of income around the poverty line,
and thus according to the choice of that poverty line. It can be shown for instance
that, for a constant Lorenz curve and thus for constant relative inequality, the
elasticity of the poverty headcount to growth will tend mechanically to increase
with average income in the economy and to decrease with the poverty line.
An additional central issue in the discussion of growth is whether we should
be interested in its impact on absolute poverty or on relative inequality2. As we
discuss below, the same critical issue arises in the discussion of whether these
changes are pro-poor. To assess whether growth is pro-poor, it is thus ﬁrst impor-
tant to distinguish between growth that is expected to change the incomes of the
1See, among many others, Bourguignon (2003), Bruno et al. (1998), Dollar and Kraay (2002),
Eastwood and Lipton (2001), Ravallion (2002), United Nations (2000), and World Bank (2002).
2Note that concerns for relative inequality are closely linked to concerns for relative poverty,
as has recently been discussed by Foster and Sen (1997), Zheng, Formby, Smith and Chow (2000),
and Duclos and Makdissi (2004).
1poor either by the same absolute or by the same proportional amount.
Absolute poverty is usually of greater concern in developing countries. In-
terest in relative poverty has nevertheless gained signiﬁcant ground in developed
economies3. It is also emerging as an important issue in developing countries too.
One reason for this is that inequality may be potentially bad for growth4. Higher
inequality may also be bad because, ceteris paribus, it usually makes poverty fall
slower for a given level of economic growth. Inequality further breeds relative de-
privation, economic isolation and social exclusion, which may be of concern for
social cohesion and political stability. Finally, relative inequality can be deemed
bad on its own for well-known ethical reasons – such as those developed in Rawls
(1971).
The nature of the impact of growth on inequality and poverty will thus depend
on numerous factors, such as the initial distributional conditions (namely, inequal-
ity and average income levels), the type of growth experienced, the functioning of
markets, and the ability of the poor to partake in the growth process. Because
of this, we can expect a high degree of heterogeneity of the effects of growth on
absolute and relative poverty across and within countries.
It is not an objective of this paper to explore the empirical context-speciﬁc
evidence for that heterogeneity. Instead, we propose methods that can help shed
light on its magnitude. This paper does this by investigating how pro-poor judge-
ments can be made robust to the choice of pro-poor evaluation functions and to the
choice of poverty lines. This is done by considering classes of pro-poor evalua-
tion functions which show varying distribution-sensitivity to the assessment of the
impact of growth, and by considering ranges of possible poverty lines over which
to deﬁne the sets of the poor. This is in contrast to much of the earlier literature
which focussed on summary pro-poor measures with ﬁxed poverty lines5. In con-
3See among many others Atkinson et. al. (2002).
4See for instance Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Deiniger and Squire (1998).
5See, for instance, McCulloch and Baulch (1999) for the difference between a post-change
poverty headcount with that headcount which would have occurred if all had gained equally, Kak-
wani et al. (2003) for a ”poverty equivalent growth rate”, Kakwani and Pernia (2000) for a ratio
of the actual change in poverty over the change that would have been observed under distribu-
tional neutrality, Dollar and Kraay (2002) for a comparison of the growth rate in average income
to the growth rate of incomes in the lowest quintile, Ravallion and Chen (2003) for a comparison
of the growth rate in average income to a ”population weighted” average growth rate of the ini-
tially poor percentiles of the population (for more, see page 8), Klasen (2003) for a comparison of
the growth rate in average income to ”population” and ”poverty weighted” average growth rates,
Essama-Nssah (2004) for the use of an ethically-ﬂexible weighted average of individual growth
rates that does not make use of poverty lines, and Ravallion and Datt (2002) for an example of the
2trast to the earlier literature, we also distinguish formally between absolute and
relative pro-poor judgements. Note ﬁnally that the derived tools can be applied
equally well to understanding the impact of any distributional change, including
that of negative growth – for instance, ”are recessions pro-poor?” – and of public
expenditures.
The rest of the paper runs as follows. Section 2 formalizes our measurement of
pro-poor changes, using either absolute or relative standards. Section 3 concludes.
The Appendix regroups the proofs of the most important methodological results.
2 Measuring pro-poor changes










+ be a vector of non-negative initial incomes6







be an analogous vector of
posterior incomes (at time 2) of size n2.
To determine whether the movement from y1 to y2 is pro-poor, we ﬁrst need
to deﬁne a standard with which this assessment can be made. A formal treatment
of these standards is provided in Axioms 7 (relative) and 13 (absolute). Take the
case of a relative standard, which we will denote as 1+g. Roughly speaking, 1+g
is some change in living standards that we wish the poor to undergo to ”catch up”
with the change in the overall distribution of income. It will often be a function
of the evolution of the entire income distributions, but it does not need to be. This
standard will play a crucial role in the analysis below. Various interpretations can
be given to it:
² It can be set on an ”ethical” basis. An example of this would be 1+g set as
the ratio of the mean of y2 over that of y1. It would then be felt desirable
that the incomes of the poor increase in proportion to average growth in the
population (see again Axiom 7). As we discuss below in Section 2.2, this
has links with concerns for relative poverty. Another example of relativity
would be the ratio of changes in ”equally distributed equivalent incomes” of
the well-known Kolm-Atkinson-Sen type. The pro-poor standard can also
be absolute: it would then be felt desirable that the incomes of the poor
very common use of growth elasticities of poverty measures. A recent study which goes beyond
focussing on summary pro-poor measures with a ﬁxed poverty line is Son (2004) – see also the
discussion on page 13.
6Or consumption, wealth, or any other welfare indicator of interest.
3increase by at least the same amount as some indicators of welfare in the
population — see Axiom 13.
² 1 + g can also be set on a more ”statistical” basis. An example of this
would be the use of the ratio of the median of y2 over that of y1 — it is
oftenarguedthat, forrelativepovertycomparisons, estimatorsofthemedian
are statistically more robust and less subject to sampling variability than
estimators of the mean.
² g can also be set on the basis of political or administrative criteria. Govern-
ment agencies can, for instance, ﬁx pro-poor objectives for changes in the
living standards of the poor, and then wish to assess whether these objec-
tives have been met.
Note that the above framework is general enough to accommodate negative as
well as positive growth.
Denote by z > 0 a poverty line deﬁned in real terms. Let W (y1;y2;g;z)
be a pro-poor evaluation function. This is deﬁned as the difference between two



















We can interpret P and P ¤ as assessing the ”ill-fare” of the poor in the initial
and posterior distributions, respectively. Note that the evaluation function P ¤ (¢)
differs from P (¢) in part because of the use of the pro-poor standard g in assessing
the second distribution. We then have:
Deﬁnition 1 The change from y1 to y2 is pro-poor if W (y1;y2;g;z) · 0.
Clearly, whether the distributional change will be deemed pro-poor will de-
pend on the way in which z, P, and P ¤ will be chosen. The central goal of this
paper is to explore how we may circumvent this dependence by imposing suitable
general conditions on these objects, for a given g. Note that the weak inequality in
Deﬁnition 1 could alternatively be replaced by a strict inequality, to make it a strict
deﬁnition of pro-poor changes. A consequence of this would be to change the ax-
ioms to be deﬁned below to strict axioms, and the inequalities in the conditions of
the Theorems to strict conditions.
We start with a focus axiom:
4Axiom 2 (Focusonthepoor)Lety = (y1;:::;yn)and _ y = (min(y1;z);:::;min(yn;z)).
Then W (y;y2;g;z) = W (_ y;y2;g;z).
This is a rather uncontroversial axiom when the objective is to assess the well-
being of the poor and of its evolution. Note, however, that this focus axiom does
not imply that pro-poor judgements are necessarily made irrespective of the evo-
lution of the well-being of the rich. As discussed above, taking into account the
evolution of the overall distribution would and can appear through the standard g.
Axiom 3 (Population invariance) Adding a replication of a population yj;j =
1;2; (initial or posterior) to that same population has no impact on W.
This is a common axiom in welfare economics. For our purposes, it makes
it possible to make pro-poor judgements even when the absolute population size
varies across the distributions. Note that this axiom may not always be appro-
priate. One example is the case of the assessment of the pro-poor effect of the
AIDS epidemics. This epidemics might in some circumstances have the impact
of increasing the average well-being of the surviving poor, but at the presumably
substantial social costs of decreasing total population size.
Axiom 4 (Population symmetry or anonymity) Let a (initial or posterior) distri-
bution of size n be given by y. Let M be an nxn permutation matrix7 and let
_ y = My0. Then we should have that W (y;y2;g;z) = W (_ y;y2;g;z).
This axiom is also standard in welfare economics. Permuting the incomes of
any two persons in any given distribution does not affect pro-poor judgements.
Note that this axiom leads to violations of the well-known Pareto efﬁciency-
criterion: for growth to be declared pro-poor, for instance, it is not needed that
none of the poor be penalized by the change. Hence, pro-poor growth (as deﬁned
here) is compatible in principle with a fair amount of ”horizontal inequality” (for a
discussion of this, see for instance Ravallion (2003) and Bibi and Duclos (2003)).
Axiom 5 (Monotonicity ) Let y be an income vector, let ² > 0 be any pos-
itive constant, and let _ y = (y1;:::;yj + ²;:::;yn). Then W (y1;y;g;z) ¸
W (y1; _ y;g;z).
7A permutation matrix is composed of 0’s and 1’s, with each row and each column summing
to 1.
5Axiom 5 is reminiscent of the Pareto principle: for a given g, if anyone’s pos-
terior income increases, W should not increase, and may sometimes fall. Because
of the anonymity axiom 4, it does not follow, however, that only those changes
that are Pareto efﬁcient will be judged pro-poor. As hinted to already, many of
the pro-poor changes that we will be able to identify in the aggregate will in fact
involve adverse changes for many of the poor.
The following is a normalization axiom: if there has been no distributional
change, and if the pro-poor standard g equals 0, then the pro-poor judgement is
necessarily neutral.
Axiom 6 (No distributional change combined with g = 0 implies pro-poor neu-
trality) For any y 2 <n
+, we must have W (y;y;0;z) = 0.
2.2 Pro-poor judgements using relative pro-poor standards
We start with the ﬁrst of two main approaches to assessing pro-poor changes:
the relative (or proportional) one. (The second approach will be discussed in
section 2.3.) This ﬁrst approach is also the most widespread and probably the
least controversial of the two. It essentially says that pro-poor judgements should
be made by comparing the growth of the poor’s living standards to a standard g.
It is consistent, for instance, with the view of Kakwani and Pernia (2000) that
”promoting pro-poor growth requires a strategy that is deliberately biased in favor
of the poor so that the poor beneﬁt proportionately more than the rich. (p.3)”. The
relevant axiom is as follows:
Axiom 7 (Relative pro-poor standards) Consider two posterior distributions, y
and _ y, both of sizes n, with respective pro-poor standards g and _ g. Suppose that
y=(1 + g) = _ y=(1 + _ g). Then, y and _ y should be judged equally pro-poor by W









1; _ y; _ g;z
¢
(2)
for any choice of y1.
2.2.1 First-order pro-poor judgements
The axioms above deﬁne a ﬁrst class of pro-poor evaluation functions.
Deﬁnition 8 The class of pro-poor evaluation functions ­1(g;z+) is made of all
of the functions W (¢;¢;g;z)
6² which satisfy the focus-on-the-poor axiom 2, the population axiom 3, the
anonymity axiom 4, the monotonicity axiom 5, the normalization axiom 6,
and the proportionality axiom 7,
² and for which z · z+.
The problem is then to check whether all such pro-poor evaluation functions
will unanimously declare some distributional change to be pro-poor. To check
this, let I(¢) be an indicator function that takes the value 1 if its argument is true









i · y): (3)
The distribution function for yj=(1 + g) is given by F
j
(y) = F j((1 + g)y). Us-
ing F
j
(y) is equivalent to using the distribution of incomes yj divided by (1 + g).
First-order pro-poor distributional changes are then identiﬁed as follows8:
Theorem 9 (First-order relative pro-poor judgements) A movement from y1 to
y2 is judged pro-poor by all pro-poor evaluation functions W (¢;¢;g;z) that are
members of ­1(g;z+) if and only if
F
2 ((1 + g)z) · F
1 (z) for all z 2 [0;z
+]: (4)
A distributional change that satisﬁes (4) is called ﬁrst-order pro-poor since all
pro-poor evaluation functions within ­1(g;z+) will ﬁnd that it is pro-poor, and
this, for any choice of poverty line within [0;z+]. (The term ”ﬁrst-order” is used
in reference to the stochastic dominance literature, where utility or social wel-
fare functions are deemed to be of the ﬁrst-order type if they are monotonically
increasing in returns or in incomes.)
Verifying (4) simply involves checking whether – over the range of poverty
lines [0;z+] – the headcount index in the initial distribution is larger than the
headcount index in the posterior distribution when that distribution is normalized
by 1 + g. An example of this is shown on Figure 1. The movement from distribu-
tion 1 to distribution 2 is ﬁrst-order pro-poor for all choices of poverty lines up to
z++, which in this case includes z+.
8The proofs of Theorems 9 and 12 appear in the appendix.
72.2.2 Discussion
There are several alternative (though equivalent) ways of checking whether a dis-
tributional change can be declared ﬁrst-order pro-poor. These alternative proce-
dures may be deemed attractive on intuitive, expositional, computational or sta-
tistical grounds. To describe them, deﬁne as Qj(p) the quantile function for dis-
tribution F j. 9 In a continuous setting and with a strictly positive income density,
Q(p) is simply the inverse of the distribution function, that is, it equals F (¡1)(p).
Roughly speaking, Q(p) is the income of that individual who is at rank p in the
distribution. The normalized quantile for F j is Q
j
(p) = Qj(p)=(1 + g). The
normalized poverty gap (or deprivation) at rank p is then given by dj(p;z) =
z¡1 max(0;(z ¡ Qj (p))).
Checking condition (4) can then be shown to be equivalent to checking, for all






viz, the normalized posterior incomes at rank p are larger than the incomes












i.e., the posterior poverty gap with (1 + g)z+ is lower than the poverty gap
before with z+.
Ravallion and Chen (2003) suggests the use of ”growth incidence curves” to
check whether growth is pro-poor. These curves show the growth rates of living





9It is formally deﬁned as Qj(p) = inffs ¸ 0jFj(s) ¸ pg for p 2 [0;1]:
8An alternative name for these curves would be ”income growth curves”. Such
a name could avoid confusion with the well-known ”poverty incidence curves”,
sincetheincomegrowthcurvesdonotinthemselvessaymuchabouttheincidence
of poverty, or about its change.
Ravallion and Chen show that the average height of these curves is linked to
changes in the Watts index of poverty following distributional changes. Although
this interpretation is certainly useful, the main disadvantage of this average height
is indeed that it is strictly valid only for the Watts index. The Watts index has,
indeed, properties with which not all pro-poor analysts will necessarily agree.
To see this, assume a poverty line equal to 100,000 (in whatever units). Also
assume two individuals with income 1 and 20 respectively. For most analysts,
these two individuals will not seem very different in terms of deprivation since
their income’s distance from the poverty line is roughly the same. Yet, the Watts
index falls following a distributional change that gives 1 unit of income to the
ﬁrst individual and withdraws 9 units from the second individual. This also shows
why (assuming g = 0) the Watts index would say that such a change is pro-poor,
even though it decreases signiﬁcantly the average incomes of the very poor. Other
pro-poor judgements may clearly not agree with this.
Note also that the link between the area under the income growth curves and
the change in the Watts poverty index is only valid for marginal distributional
changes. Instead of taking the average of income growth rates, it would seem
safer to consider the entire income growth curve ¡(p) of equation (8). This is
done by condition (6) and is again equivalent to checking whether a distributional
change is unambiguously ﬁrst-order pro-poor.
Care must also be taken in the interpretation of relative pro-poor comparisons
when these are made across countries with varying headcounts. Assume that the
pro-poor standard 1 + g is set as the ratio of mean incomes. By deﬁnition, it
will then be much more difﬁcult to have a ”pro-poor growth rate” (and thus a
”rich-averse growth rate”) in societies in which there are few rich. At the limit,
if everyone is initially poor, it will be impossible to verify condition (4)– this is
becauseitisimpossibleforeveryone’sincometogrowfasterthanaverageincome.
Relativepro-poor judgementswouldthen seemto makesenseonly indistributions
in which there is a signiﬁcant number of non-poor individuals to whom the poor
can be compared.
The use of the above conditions is illustrated on Figures 2, 3 and 4. The ﬁlled
line on Figure 2 shows the values of the p-quantiles in the posterior distribution
(ontheverticalaxis)againstthevaluesofthep-quantiles(ofthesamepercentilep)
9of the initial distribution (on the horizontal axis). The condition Q
2
(p) ¸ Q1(p)
requires that this line be above a line that starts from the origin with a slope of
1 + g. Two such pro-poor standards 1 + g are shown on Figure 2: the ﬁrst one,
m2=m1, is the ratio of the medians, and the second one, ¹2=¹1, is the ratio of the
means. The distributional change is deemed ﬁrst-order pro-poor for all choices of
poverty lines within a range [0;z++] when the ratio of the medians is considered
to be the relevant pro-poor standard. That range extends beyond z+ when the ratio
of the mean is used instead.
An equivalent statement is obtained by looking instead at the income growth
curve ¡(p) of Figure 3. Recall that we need to check whether that curve is above
g. On Figure 3, g is taken to be either the growth in median or in average income.
When growth in median income is considered (g = m2=m1¡1), the distributional
change is considered ﬁrst-order pro-poor over all poverty lines within [0;z++];
that range extends again further (and in fact beyond z+) when growth in mean
income (g = ¹2=¹1 ¡ 1) is taken as the pro-poor standard. An alternative way to
affect the range of poverty lines over which the distributional change is ﬁrst-order
pro-poor is to ask that the incomes of the poor grow by more than a proportion °+
of the growth of median income (g = °+ (¹2=¹1 ¡ 1)). With some °+ < 1, the
growth shown on Figure 3 is judged pro-poor until z+.
The link between income growth and changes in poverty gaps is illustrated on
Figure 4. The values of the p-quantiles are shown on the left vertical axis and
those of the poverty gaps appear on the right vertical axis. For all p 2 [0;F 1(z+)],
we have that Q
2
(p) ¸ Q1(p). Thus, the use of the quantiles Q1(p) and Q
2
(p) in
Figure 4 shows ﬁrst-order pro-poorness until (at least) z+. This is also veriﬁed by
”inverting” the axes and noting on the horizontal axis that F
2
(z) · F 1 (z) for all
z 2 [0;z+] (condition (4)). Condition (7) is veriﬁed on Figure 4 by noting that
the posterior gaps with (1 + g)z+ are always larger than the initial gaps with z+
whatever the percentiles p considered.
2.2.3 Second-order pro-poor judgements
First-order pro-poor judgements are demanding. They require all quantiles of the
poor to undergo a rate of growth at least as large as g. Some pro-poor analysts
may be willing to relax this condition on the basis that a large rate of growth for
the poorer among the poor may sometimes be ethically sufﬁcient to offset a rate of
growth for the not-so-poor that may be below g. This is captured by the following
axiom.
10Axiom 10 (Distribution sensitivity) Let y be an ordered income vector, ² > 0 be
any positive value, and let _ y = (y1;:::;yj + ²;:::;yk ¡ ²;:::;yn), with yj +² ·
yk. Then W (y1;y;g;z) ¸ W (y1; _ y;g;z).
This axiom is analogous to the well-known Pigou-Dalton principle of trans-
fers in welfare economics. It says that the evaluation functions P should give
more weight to the poorer than to the not-so-poor among the poor. ”By how much
more?” does not need to be speciﬁed in our general context (since we are inter-
ested in classes of pro-poor judgements). Axiom 10 thus leads to ”distribution-
sensitive” pro-poor judgements: shifting incomes from the richer to the poorer is
a pro-poor distributional change.
The monotonicity and the distribution-sensitive axioms lead to two different
orders of pro-poor judgements. The ﬁrst order (monotonicity) says that distribu-
tional impacts on the poor are independently important at all poor individuals’
initial income levels. The second order (distribution sensitivity) imposes that the
distributional impacts on the poorer individuals cannot be ethically less important
than similar distributional impacts on the richer individuals.
Deﬁnition 11 The class of pro-poor evaluation functions ­2(g;z+) is made of all
functions W (¢;¢;g;z)
² which satisfy the focus-on-the-poor axiom 2, the population axiom 3, the
anonymity axiom 4, the monotonicity axiom 5, the normalization axiom 6,
the proportionality axiom 7, and the distribution-sensitivity axiom 10,
² and for which z · z+.





















Theorem 12 (Second-order relative pro-poor judgements) A movement from y1
to y2 is judged pro-poor by all pro-poor evaluation functions W (¢;¢;g;z) that are
members of ­2(g;z+) if and only if
D
2 ((1 + g)z) · D
1 (z) for all z 2 [0;z
+]: (10)
11A distributional change that satisﬁes condition (10) is called second-order pro-
poor since all relative pro-poor evaluation functions that are distribution-sensitive
will ﬁnd that it is pro-poor, and this, for any choice of poverty line within [0;z+].
To reach this conclusion, it must simply be checked that the initial poverty deﬁcit
using z is larger than the posterior poverty deﬁcit with (1 + g)z, over a range of
poverty lines z 2 [0;z+].
2.2.4 Discussion
As for ﬁrst-order pro-poor judgements, there are alternative equivalent ways of







Note that Gj(p;z) attains its maximum value of Dj(z) at p = F j(z). Checking
condition (10) is then equivalent to checking that G2(p;(1 + g)z+) · G1(p;z+)
for all p 2 [0;1]. This is illustrated on Figure 5. Because G2(p;(1 + g)z+) ·
G1(p;z+) for all p 2 [0;1], the distributional change is deemed second-order pro-
poor for any choice of poverty lines between 0 and z+. Note that this implies
graphically that D2 ((1 + g)z+) · D1 (z+) since Gj(1;z) ´ Dj(z). But it does
not follow that F
2
(z+) · F 1 (z+) (recall condition (4)). In fact, the opposite
is shown on Figure 5: the headcount (with (1 + g)z+) after the change is larger
than the headcount (with z+) before the change. First-order pro-poorness implies
second-order pro-poorness, but not the reverse.
Similarly to (11), the cumulative income up to rank p (the Generalized Lorenz







The use of the Generalized Lorenz curve provides an intuitive sufﬁcient condition
for checking second-order pro-poor change. A distributional change is indeed







10This is also called a TIP curve by Jenkins and Lambert (1997), and a poverty gap proﬁle by
Shorrocks (1998); see also Spencer and Fisher (1992).
12Expression (13) involves computing the growth rates in the cumulative incomes of
proportions p of the poorest, and to compare those growth rates to g. If the cumu-
lative incomes of the poor increase faster than the pro-poor standard, then growth
is pro-poor for all relative distribution-sensitive pro-poor assessments. Note also
that when 1 + g equals the ratio of mean income, condition (13) is equivalent to




The use above of the Lorenz and generalized Lorenz curves to check for
second-order pro-poor changes is reminiscent of Son (2004). There are three main
differences between this section’s contribution and that of Son. First, Son does not
condition her comparisons of the Lorenz and generalized Lorenz curves on those
incomes falling below an upper poverty line z+ — she implicitly sets z+ = 1.
Given that we can generally agree on some ﬁnite upper bounds for ranges of pos-
sible poverty lines, setting z+ to inﬁnity would seem to be unnecessarily strong
and to limit too much one’s ability to identify second-order pro-poor changes.
Second, she considers only additive poverty evaluation functions. Finally, she as-
sumes that relative pro-poor standards 1+g equal the ratio of mean incomes. The
analysis here is thus more general on these three aspects.
The combined use of conditions (6) and (13) is illustrated on Figure 6. Note
ﬁrst (as for Figure 5) that F
2
(z+) > F 1 (z+). Moreover, the income growth curve
¡(p) clearly shows that income growth is sometimes lower than g for some of the
percentiles below F 1 (z+). Hence, the distributional change of Figure 6 is not
ﬁrst-order pro-poor for all poverty lines up to z+. That change could be deemed
ﬁrst-order pro-poor only if we relaxed our pro-poor standard (by decreasing G
to ¡(F 1(z+)), or if we chose z++ instead of z+ as the upper bound of the range
of possible poverty lines. An alternative route to generating pro-poorness would
be to add the distribution-sensitivity Axiom 10. Doing this indeed makes the
distributional change of Figure 6 second-order pro-poor for all poverty lines up to
z+ since ¸(p) ¸ g for all p between 0 and F
2
(z+).
2.3 Pro-poor judgements using absolute pro-poor standards
The second of the two main approaches alluded to before is an absolute one. It
says that pro-poor judgements should be made by comparing the absolute change
in the poor’s living standards to some absolute pro-poor standard a. Although a
is an absolute standard in the sense of Axiom 13, it need not be independent of
the distribution of living standards. It could represent, for instance, the absolute
13change in average living standards or in some equally-distributed living standards.
Axiom 13 (Absolute pro-poor standards) Consider two posterior distributions, y
and _ y, both of sizes n, with respective pro-poor standards a and _ a. Suppose that
y + a = _ y + _ a. Then, y and _ y should be judged equally pro-poor by W, that is,









1; _ y; _ a;z
¢
(14)
for any choice of y1 2 <n
+.
This alternative axiomatization says essentially that P ¤ should be ”translation
invariant” in y and a. The pro-poor judgement should be neutral whenever the
poor gain in absolute terms the same as the standard a. This axiom allows us to
deﬁne the following class of absolute pro-poor evaluation functions.
Deﬁnition 14 The class of pro-poor evaluation functions ~ ­1(a;z+) is made of all
of the functions W (¢;¢;a;z)
² which satisfy the focus-on-the-poor axiom 2, the population axiom 3, the
anonymity axiom 4, the monotonicity axiom 5, the normalization axiom 6,
and the absoluteness axiom 13,
² and for which z · z+.
Then:
Theorem 15 (First-order absolute pro-poor judgements) A movement from y1 to
y2 is judged pro-poor by all pro-poor evaluation functions W (¢;¢;a;z) that are
members of ~ ­1(a;z+) if and only if
F
2 (z + a) · F
1 (z) for all z 2 [0;z
+]: (15)
An analogous result holds for absolute pro-poor judgements that are distribu-
tion sensitive.
Deﬁnition 16 The class of pro-poor evaluation functions ~ ­2(a;z+) is made of all
functions W (¢;¢;a;z)
² which satisfy the focus-on-the-poor axiom 2, the population axiom 3, the
anonymity axiom 4, the monotonicity axiom 5, the normalization axiom 6,
the distribution-sensitivity axiom 10, and the absoluteness axiom 13,
14² and for which z · z+.
Let ~ Dj(z) be deﬁned as zDj(z). This leads to:
Theorem 17 (Second-order absolute pro-poor judgements) A movement from y1
to y2 is judged pro-poor by all pro-poor evaluation functions W (¢;¢;a;z) that are
members of ~ ­2(a;z+) if and only if
~ D
2 (z + a) · ~ D
1 (z) for all z 2 [0;z
+]: (16)
Note that the change in the average income of the bottom p proportion of the
population is given by (C2(p) ¡ C1(p))=p. A sufﬁcient condition for Condition
(16) is then to verify whether that change exceeds a whatever the value of p 2
[0; ~ F 2(z+)].
3 Concluding remarks
Thepaperhasproposedsimplegraphicalteststotestwhetherdistributionalchanges
are ”robustly” pro-poor, in the sense of whether broad classes of ethical judge-
ments would declare a distributional change to be pro-poor. An important issue
is whether pro-poor judgements should put relatively more emphasis on the im-
pact of growth upon the poorer of the poor. Another issue is whether these stan-
dards should be absolute or relative. A number of tests logically equivalent to
those of Theorems 9 and 12 have also been outlined for relative pro-poor judge-
ments. Analogous equivalent conditions can further be derived for absolute pro-
poor judgements of the ﬁrst and second order. It is also possible to derive tests
for pro-poor judgements of any higher order desired using curves of normalized
FGT (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984)) indices, as is done in the stochastic
dominance literature (see for instance Duclos and Makdissi (2004)).
As was mentioned in the introduction, the formulation of the paper is general
enough to accommodate negative and positive growth as well as whether public
policy and public expenditures are pro-poor. Note ﬁnally that the property of the
pro-poor standard does not need to be independent of whether growth is nega-
tive or not. For instance, one may choose for positive growth a relative pro-poor
standard, and for negative growth an absolute one. Then, positive growth will be
deemed pro-poor only if it increases the incomes of the poor by proportionately
more than the relative standard, but a recession will be deemed pro-poor only if
does not lead to an absolute decrease of those same incomes — independently of
whether the relative distribution of incomes has moved in favor of the poor.
154 Appendix: proofs of the theorems
Preliminary remarks:
1. Axiom 7 implies that W (y1;y2;g;z) should be homogeneous of degree 0


















2. Axiom6impliesthatP ¤ (y;1;z) = P (y;z), andwecanthereforesubstitute
P ¤ (y2=(1 + g);1;z) in (17) by P (y2=(1 + g);z).
3. We will assume in the proofs below that we are comparing two distributions
of the same size n. Achieving a common size for any two distributions can
always be achieved by suitable replications of these two distributions. Such
replications have no impact on W (by axiom 3), nor on the distribution
functions (this can be readily veriﬁed by considering equation (3)). (Using
distributionfunctionseffectivelynormalizespopulationsizeto1, whichalso
has expositional advantages.)
4. We will generally assume that y1 and y2 have been anonymously ordered in
non-decreasing values, which will guarantee that axiom 4 will be obeyed.
Interchanging the values of any two yi and yj will also leave unchanged
their distribution function F(y).
5. Recall that by axiom 6, we have that W(y1;y2;g;z) = P(y2=(1 + g);z)¡
P(y1;z). For expositional simplicity, we may therefore work in the proofs
with F 2(y) and y2 instead of F
2
(y) and y2=g, and we use ­1(1;z+) instead
of ­1(g;z+). We can then reinterpret pro-poor judgements as the more gen-
eral problem of comparing a poverty index across two distributions. The
previous literature has considered this problem in an additive context (see
Foster and Shorrocks (1988a,b) and Duclos and Makdissi (2004) for in-
stance), but not to our knowledge in the context of the more general non-
additive formulation considered in this paper.
4.1 Proof of Theorem 9
4.1.1 Sufﬁciency of condition (4):
If F 2(z) · F 1(z); 8z 2 [0;z+], then W (y1;y2;1;z) · 0; 8W 2 ­1(1;z+).
16Proof:
Denote ﬁrst by !1(z¤) the subset of all W(¢;¢;1;z¤) which belong to ­1(1;z+)





(Suppose otherwise: if y1
i > y2
i, then by (3) we will have that F 2(y) > F 1(y) for
all y 2 [y2
i;y1
i[.)





h;z;:::;z). Combining this to the monotonicity principle of Axiom



















Hence, W (y1;y2;1;z¤) · 08W 2 !1(z¤). This argument can be repeated
for any other choice of z¤ 2 [0;z+]. Therefore, the result must hold for all W 2
­1(1;z+).
4.1.2 Necessity of condition (4):
Only if F 2(y) · F 1(y); 8y 2 [0;z+], will W (y1;y2;1;z) · 08W 2 ­1(1;z+).
Proof: Assume that F 2(y) > F 1(y) for some range [y;y] with y ¸ y < z+.
Then it must be that, for some i, z+ ¸ y2
i < y1
i. (Assume that this is not the
case: then, by (3), it must be F 2(y) · F 1(y) for all y · z+, which violates
the above assumption.) Choose for P(¢;z) the distribution function F(z), with
z = y2
i. F(z) belongs to the class ­1(1;z+) since it obeys all of the relevant
axioms and since z · z+ by assumption. This particular function is, however,
such that F 2(y2
i) ¡ F 1(y2
i) = i=n ¡ F 1(y2
i) > i=n ¡ F 1(y1
i) = 0 since it was
chosen such that y1
i > y2
i. This exercise can be done for any other range [y;y]
such that y < z+. Hence condition F 2(y) · F 1(y)8y 2 [0;z+] is necessary for
the result.
4.2 Proof of Theorem 12
4.2.1 Sufﬁciency of condition (10):
If D2(y) · D1(y); 8y 2 [0;z+], then W (y1;y2;1;z) · 0; 8W 2 ­2(1;z+).
Proof:
17To prove sufﬁciency, we will work in steps. Each step creates a new distri-
bution from the initial distribution F 1 through a series of beneﬁcial Pigou-Dalton
transfers.
Step 1















ordered in increasing value. Let ¢jF(z) = F 1;j(z) ¡ F 2(z) and ¢jD(z) =
D1;j(z) ¡ D2(z), where F 1;j(z) and D1;j(z) are the distribution and deﬁcit func-
tions for a vector y1;j. Since D2(y) · D1(y) for all y 2 [0;z+], it must then be
that ¢D0(y) ¸ 0 for all y 2 [0;z+]
First, note that we must have that y
1;0
1 · y2
1 since otherwise we would have
that ¢0D(z) < 0 for all z 2 [y2
1;y
1;0
1 ]. Hence, it must also be that ¢0F(z) ¸
08z 2 [0;z0
2].




2 , in which case ¢0F(z0
2) = 2=n > 0,
² or that z0
2 = y2
1, in which case ¢0F(z0
2) = 0.
In either case, we have that ¢0F(z0
2) ¸ 08z 2 [0;z0
3[.
Now deﬁne z¤;0 as the smallest z0
i such that ¢0F(z0
i ) < 0. If z¤;0 > z+, then
we can move directly to ”Final Step” on page 20. Let s = nF 2(z¤;0). Hence,
z¤;0 = y2
s. We will consider a series of a maximum of s ¡ 1 equalizing Pigou-
Dalton transfers that will move the initial distribution from F 1;0 to F 1;1 while
ensuring that ¢1F(z) ¸ 08z 2 [0;z¤;0].
Since ¢0F(z) ¸ 0 for all z < y2
s, it must be that y2
i ¸ y
1;0
i ;i = 1;¢¢¢ ;s ¡ 1.
Let ¿ = min(z+;y1;0
s ¡y2
s). ¿ must be strictly positive since by deﬁnition of s we
have that F 1;0 (y1;0
s ) = F 2 (y2
s) = s=n and s=n > F 1;0 (y2
s). Then, deﬁne a series






































Note from the last line of (19) that ¿ =
Ps¡1
j=1 ¿j. This is illustrated in Figure 7 for
the case of s = 3.

















y1;1 is thus obtained from y1;0 by a series of Pigou-Dalton transfers. By Axiom




Note from (19) and (20) that y
1;1
i · y2





s · z+. To verify that y
1;1
s¡1 · y2

















Hence, since ¿s¡1 = ¿ ¡
Ps¡2
j=1 ¿j, we have that
¿s¡1 =
(
























s¡1. For the second case, recall that
¢D0(y) ¸ 0; 8y · z+, which implies in particular that ¢D0(y1;0
s ) ¸ 0. From
























































¢1F(z) ¸ 08z · y2
s. When y1;0
s > z+, an exactly analogous demonstration
shows that ¢1F(z) ¸ 08z · z+.
19We must now show that ¢D1(z) ¸ 08z 2 [0;z+]. We start by showing
that ¢D0(z) = ¢D1(z)8z ¸ y1;0
s . D2(z) is clearly unchanged by the above
movement from y1;0 to y1;1. For all z ¸ y1;0































+ (z ¡ y1;0












































j for j > s and the last line from Ps
j=1 ¿j = ¿.
It also follows that ¢1D(z) ¸ 08z · y1;0
s . To see this, note that, for z < y1;1
s ,
we have


























and for z 2 [y1;1
s ;y1;0















































We have therefore obtained a vector y1;1 such that ¢1D(z) ¸ 0 for all z < z+
and such that P(y1;1) · P(y1;0).
End of Step 1 If ¢1F(z) ¸ 0 for all z · z+, we move to Final Step. If not,
we move to Next Step by reordering y1;1 if needed.
Next Step We proceed as for Step 1, iteratively until the point is reached at
which ¢JF(z) ¸ 08z · z+.
Final Step Say that the above procedure has taken J steps. By the focus
























By the focus axiom, we have that P(y¤2) = P(y2). Since ¢JF(z) · 08z · z+,
by the monotonicity axiom and Theorem 9, and considering the recursive process
started by (21), we have P(y¤2) · P(y1;J+1). Hence, considering (21), we obtain
W = P(y
2) ¡ P(y
1) · 0: (31)
Since this is true for any of the P that obeys the conditions of Theorem 12, (31)
must be true for all W 2 ­2(z+).
4.2.2 Necessity of condition (10):
Only if D2(y) · D1(y); 8y 2 [0;z+] will W (y1;y2;1;z) · 0; 8W 2 ­2(1;z+).
Proof:
As for the proof in 4.1.2, but choosing instead the deﬁcit function as the P
function.
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